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[Abstract] The international aspects of corruption have received considerable atten-
tion in both research and policy: What determines whether a country is highly corrupt or 
not?  Most research has sought to answer this question by considering each country as 
reﬂecting the same kind of mechanism explaining both the high and low outcomes. In 
this paper some of the theoretical explanations suggested in the literature are reviewed 
at the same time as it suggests how the question needs to be rephrased if each coun-
try’s corruption rate is inﬂuenced by an internationally open economic system.
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1. Introduction 
 In this paper I will make a critical survey of some of the research that has taken place 
recently which relates corruption and cross-border economic interaction: international 
trade, capital and migration movements. While it is motivated by a number of 
intriguing results reached by  the empirical, econometric research of the field, I will 
here focus on theory and major policy issues. This is partly based on a conviction that 
much of  this research has become so inspired by the  many new and interesting 
datasets that have become accessible in the field that many have jumped into the sea 
of new data without ensuring that they possess the necessary depth to safely carry 
such dives. In a second paper the relevant empirical literature will be discussed more 
directly. The surveys are the first step in a research project that is dealing with the 
geographical distribution of  governance indicators and the cross-border intensities of 
economic interaction.  
 
Corruption has become an important policy concern in an increasing number of 
countries. It has moved into many national policy agendas. Nevertheless, the recent 
upsurge in the policy concern that has taken place since the early 1990s arose in 
connection to activities in international organizations. Corruption has to a large extent 
also remained an international issue, although most corruption, of course, arises in 
internationally immobile, national public organizations. Hence an underlying critical 
policy issue has been whether changes in the international institutional architecture 
and policies may reduce both cross-border corruption and corruption in the single 
country.  
 
During the same period a strong policy thrust towards the dismantling of policy 
barriers against international trade and capital movement has made its impression on 
the political order. One of the arguments for the resulting change in the international 
institutional architecture and economic policies towards increased international 
economic openness, is that it should also cause corruption to decrease. Cross-country 
econometric studies (most strongly expressed in  Bonaglia et al, 2001) appear to 
confirm that for the single country more openness will imply less corruption.  
Nevertheless, it is also widely believed that the overall incidence of corruption 
globally has significantly increased during the period of increasing economic 
openness. This is a major policy paradox in the present international policy debate 
about corruption. 
 
A widely held perception is that corruption levels in different countries differ widely, 
even when institutional arrangements may be quite similar.  To explain this stylised 
fact has been an early ambition in theoretical corruption research (e.g. Andvig and 
Moene, 1990). Despite the construction of several corruption indexes for a large 
number of countries, it is difficult to verify whether the distribution of corruption 
across countries really is polarized towards the extremes or not. These indexes have 
no cardinal interpretation. One of the leading indexes (Kaufmann et al, 1999) even 
assumes the opposite as part of its construction - that the distribution of corruption 
across countries is approximately normal. That is, most countries cluster around some 
typical, average level.  Indirect tests assuming GDP –corruption interactions (Haque 
and Kneller, 2005) confirm a distribution of countries into a high corruption –low 
production and a low corruption- high production cluster, however. The existence of 
observations of petty corruption reported in crime victimisation surveys for a 
significant number of countries may provide further possibilities for checking the 
polarization claim empirically to be pursued in the following. Moreover, it appears 
not obvious from an empirical point of view likely that the increasing similarity of the 
economic institutional and policy architecture across countries that has followed the 
so-called globalisation in general, and the demise of the socialist economic systems in 
particular, may not have caused any levelling of corruption propensities. 
 
 2. Independent n-country observations or one international distribution? 
 
Assuming an initially wide dispersion in corruption levels across countries, what 
would happen when one opens up for higher incidence of international economic 
interaction and, hence, also more cross-border corruption? If agents and organizations 
that are located in low corruption countries interact with public agencies in high 
corruption incidence countries and agencies and organizations located in high 
corruptions countries interact with public agencies in low corruption countries, would 
the outcome be a more even incidence of corruption across countries? And if so, 
would it approach the high or low incidence countries? Or would the opening up 
rather cause an increased polarization of corruption incidence across countries?  The 
theoretical issues that arise here has so far received scant research attention. Sah 
(2005) is a partial exception, but it is sometimes unclear whether he is considering 
interacting subsystems or just compare them.   
 
Considering the likely interaction between corruption and GDP levels  would we then 
observe a clustering of countries into low corruption – high productivity and low 
productivity, as Haque and Kneller (2005).  If so, we may find one way to resolve the 
policy paradox reported above – that increased (relative) economic openness may 
contain national corruption while increased overall openness may stimulate corruption 
globally.1  
 
What about the situation when the density of cross-border economic interaction 
increases while the agents situated in different areas define corruption differently? 
Here models of cultural identity may be applicable suggesting mechanisms based on 
evolutionary game theory where increased cross-country economic interaction may 
either erode or reinforce cultural identities (Olivier et al, 2005). Hauk and Sáez-Martí 
(2001) have developed a model of corruption where ethical values are made 
endogenous in a way that may be developed to address this question.  
 
Here we will focus on corruption, but most of the ideas should also apply to rent-
seeking in general. In their analysis about the role of institutions for the growth effects 
of  resource abundance, Mehlum et al (2005)  emphasize how entrepreneurs may be 
sorted  into grabbing or productive species. If this sorting mechanism is wrong, 
resource abundance may cause an oversupply of the grabbers. In their discussion the 
                                                 
1 The easiest way to resolve he paradox is to assume that the perception of  increased global corruption 
is simply wrong and mainly caused by herd-like behaviour  among experts, businessmen and 
international officials as proposed in Andvig (2002). 
stock of entrepreneurs is given and by implication consisting only of nationals. But 
what will happen if we consider free movement of entrepreneurs across countries? 
What will then be the effects of different national sorting mechanisms? Did the 
opening up of Russia cause an influx of mobile entrepreneurs dominated by grabbers 
to Moscow in 1991?  
 
A question that naturally arises on the basis of  the preceding, is whether the different 
possibilities may have different  geographical implications. May, for example a high 
corruption levels in one country spill over to its neighbours generating geographical 
clusters of high (and low) corruption areas?  We have not found the question 
formulated at this level of abstraction in the literature, however.  The answer may not 
be so completely obvious as one may think at the first glance, since we may imagine 
that a highly corrupt country so to speak soak up many of its conceivable external 
transactions and will therefore have little impact on its neighbours. There might be 
little regular cross-border economic transactions to carry any extensive spread of 
forms of behaviour including corrupt ones. On the other hand, such geographic 
clustering appears to be established fact.  To explain it, we may have to  reduce the 
level of abstraction, however.   
 
Most of the research that either directly or by implication has studied  the distribution 
of corruption levels across countries, their cross- border regular economic transactions  
and the international institutional architecture, has been performed at a lower level of 
abstraction. The focus has been the single country. Each country has been put aside of 
each other. The same corruption is assumed to take place in each, but yielding, of 
course, different outcomes. The result for each country is then compared. The 
outcome with respect to the distribution of corruption and economic activity levels 
across countries and the international institutional architecture is reached by filling in 
the outcomes  for each country.  This is a standard and reasonable procedure in 
comparative studies, but if the outcome for each country is the result of  particular 
configurations of interaction,  the assumption of independent statistical trials for each 
country becomes misleading. At least in the beginning  the alternative of  non-
independence should be explored although it may lead the research into a statistical 
dead end. 
 
 The relevant research for the single country study has been organized as different 
ways to connect the dots in a triangle consisting of  policy instruments, such as trade 
policy, capital market restrictions, economic variables such as  GDP, imports, FDI, 
and corruption  levels, for example as in: 
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In this case import restrictions are endogenous and GDP levels determine corruption. 
In the research one may experiment with what should be considered exogenous or 
endogenous variables. In an influential article Kaufmann and Kraay (2002), for 
example, strongly insist that the arrow between GDP  and corruption levels should be 
turned around compared to the one shown in figure 1. The dots may be represented 
with different  policy instruments or different economic variables  while, of course, 
the corruption variable remains – as long as corruption is the issue. The corruption 
indicator chosen, may also differ, however. 
 
Since we are discussing the international propagation mechanisms for corrupt 
behaviour as well as the ways international cross-border economic opportunities may 
contain national corruption, we have to study the links between cross-border 
corruption and the economic variables that are statistically registered such as import 
and FDI. This is not made explicit in the literature. 
 
3.  Sah’s models  of large and pervasive differences in corruption levels 
across governance units in mutually isolated vs. open systems 
 
Sah (2005) presents a renewed version of an older model of his, dealing with  what he 
calls ‘atomistic’ corruption (Sah, 1988), that is repetitive, small-scale corruption. The 
1988 model was an early contribution  to the study of corruption by means of  so-
caled multiple equilibrium models. They sought to explain large and persistent 
differences in corruption levels with a minimum of assumptions about cultural 
differences. In the 2005 work Sah added  the ambition  to deal with the “even more 
challenging research issue …the presence of such differences across regions within 
the same country …”. That is by implication a study of  interacting bureaucracies.  
As concrete cases he was thinking of Bihar (highly corrupt) versus West Bengal in 
India or Northern Italy (once upon the time low corrupt and not mafia-infested) versus 
Mezzogiorno of southern Italy.  Since both citizens and bureaucrats in principle are 
mobile across regions, this is an even more open system than the kind of  globally 
open system we have in mind where only subgroups of ‘citizens’, that is companies 
and entrepreneurs, are mobile. So far, to assume officials to be internationally 
immobile is reasonable as a first approximation2.   
 
Looking more closely at his model, it does not really address this issue, however, but 
rather the former question: How may we explain persistent difference in corruption 
levels in similar societies?   Belonging to one national state could, of course, be one 
indication of similarity, but to disregard economic and bureaucratic interaction across 
regions when exploring how they may evolve differently with respect to corruption 
appears unconvincing.   Nevertheless, read accessorily, the model may generate 
different possibilities about the outcome of such interactions. 
 
Sah is considering a number of bureaucrats and citizens who are engaged in random 
meetings. Before they meet, each have to make a decision whether to initiate a corrupt 
choice in the stipulated transaction of the period. The expected utility of the choice 
hinges upon whether the other side is making the same choice with respect to 
corruption or not. Different possibilities are outlined, but most closely studied are the 
cases where the utility of making the same decision is higher than if the other side 
makes the opposite choice. Hence, the expected utility for a citizen of making a 
corrupt choice hinges upon what she believes is the probability of being confronted by 
a corrupt complementary decision by the bureaucrat. The higher that probability, the 
more profitable will the corrupt choice be. By symmetry, the same applies for the 
bureaucrat. In addition to this perceived probability the real underlying advantage of 
                                                 
2 Military bureaucracies are an interesting exception. Historically successful military bureaucracies 
from one country or region may move far into other countries or regions and set their marks on them. 
At present multinational companies and aid bureaucracies are more frequent example of  
internationally mobile bureaucracies, although the resurgence of foreign military organizations through 
peace missions should also be noted as part of the present picture. 
making the corrupt deal with a corrupt compared to with a non-corrupt, will determine 
the relative expected utility, and the choice. 
 
In addition to other bits of information, including initial beliefs, perceived 
probabilities will be updated by the participants’ experiences. This experience will 
reflect the actual, but random encounters made during the periods of the individuals’ 
economic activity. If an individual meet a corrupt other during the last period, he will 
adjust his assessment upwards. If he then made a corrupt choice, he will make the 
same choice. A higher level of corruption in the past results in higher levels of 
corruption in the future. Actual more corrupt choices made by bureaucrats jack up the 
citizens perceptions causing them to make more corrupt choices, and so on.  While 
not going into the technicalities of the model, it is not difficult to see that a structure 
like this may generate widely different corruption propensities on the basis of similar 
underlying economies.  
 
But what will happen when we have  two such economies, A and B that have 
generated quite different corruption propensities among their citizens and officials, 
but where we now allow both a fraction of their officials and  and/or citizens to move 
cross-regionally? Let us say A is the highly corrupt region and only citizens are 
moving. If somehow citizens originating in A are able immediately  to perceive the 
probability of meeting a corrupt official in B and vice versa – the chameleon case - 
nothing should happen. If on the other hand, their original corruption experiences are 
directly transferred to the new settings, a movement towards some levelling of 
corruption propensities in the regions should be expected. 
 
On the other hand, if individuals are heterogeneous in the sense that some have a 
higher propensity to engage in corrupt transactions (are more ‘evil’), an opening up of 
activity across regions should cause the dishonest persons in B to move towards A and 
the honest one in A to move in the opposite direction. Due to the positive spillover 
from corrupt behaviour among the citizens towards bureaucrats and vice versa, to 
allow interregional mobility of  bureaucrats should only reinforce the results above.  
As an historical example with mainly bureaucratic mobility across regions with 
different corruption propensities combined  we may note the development of colonial 
administrations in the 19th  century. That combined with heterogeneity  among 
bureaucrats might have made it relatively more profitable to be a corrupt bureaucrat in 
a corrupt area  inducing  a movement of corrupt bureaucrats towards colonial 
administration, but now we are relaxing the assumptions made by Sah and we move 
into logically slippery ground.  -  If we only allow movement from low corrupt  B to 
high corrupt  A, both the levelling and the polarization results would remain, but the 
‘global’ corruption would be reduced in the levelling case, but be undetermined in the 
polarization case.   
 
While this model set- up does not give much flesh regarding the determination of  the 
allocation of corruption levels across regions or countries, it allows most of the 
possibilities outlined in the introduction. Nevertheless, the assumption of positive 
spill-over between corrupt behaviour  at the two sides of transactions, disallows at 
least some possibilities. Corrupt citizens don’t move from A to B in order to exploit 
honest bureaucrats there (cf. the number of accusations in European immigration 
policy). 
4. Grabbing and corruption in open vs. closed systems 
 
In several papers focusing on the role of resource rents, Mehlum et al (2005) present a 
model upset that may also be used to analyse the effects of   cross-border  mobility  of 
entrepreneurs on the  allocation of corruption levels across countries.3  In this article 
they discuss closed economies only.  Imagining that a country possesses a given 
natural resource rent, R, that may be divided between productive and ‘grabbing’ 
entrepreneurs, but a specialized grabber may have a relative advantage in gaining 
access to the rent. The extent of this advantage is interpreted to indicate the 
institutional quality of the economy in question. The larger the advantage the lower is 
the institutional quality. 
 
 There is a given stock of entrepreneurs, who may switch between being grabbing or 
producing. Hence, the allocation of the stock between productive and grabbing 
activities will hinge upon a number of economic factors and they will switch until the 
rate of profit is equal for the two activities. The production structure is modelled so 
                                                 
3 The results in the following are quite tentative since we make no attempt here to   build in the 
mobility assumptions from scratch, hence, rebuilding their models, but rely on ad hoc ways to see what 
the likely consequences would be when we allow entrepreneurs to move  between countries in different 
production-corruption equilibria.  
that the rate of return for both producers and grabbers increase when the share of 
productive entrepreneurs increases, but more steeply so for the grabbers. The higher 
the relative share of producers, the higher the rate of production. 
 
Combining these with some more technical assumptions, Mehlum et al demonstrate 
that only two equilibria are possible: One where all entrepreneurs are productive, and 
another where we may have a mixture, a ‘ grabbing’ equilibrium.   
 
A major point in their article is to show that increased  resource rents will cause 
increased GDP  in an economy, but may cause significant economic decline in a 
grabbing equilibrium if  the institutional quality is below a certain threshold value. 
What has this to do with our question about the effects of opening economies and the 
distribution of corruption levels across countries? 
 
Note first that trivial reinterpretation of  the variables makes their  models  amenable 
for illuminating our concern: They deliberately made their grabbing processes 
general. Corruption is, of course, a major method of grabbing and natural resources is 
only one kind of rent. They may be considered as a share of  the total stock that is 
potentially available for ‘grabbing’ through the existence of public organizations. 
Different ways to organize the public sector (including the society’s natural resources) 
may create different levels of grab-able rents.4  For example, the system shift in the 
former Soviet Union may be considered to have increased the grab-able rents shifting 
entrepreneurs into corrupt activities. The regions with lowest institutional qualities 
should then induce the largest shift for a given rent increase, and the largest 
production decline. 
 
What will be the consequences of allowing cross-country mobility of entrepreneurs? 
Let us look at the simplest case and where the opening up means that the net supply of 
                                                 
4 A major difficulty with this simple reinterpretation of the variables is that the distinction between 
institutional quality and the size of the rents becomes somewhat more  fuzzy. If corruption levels 
followed pari passus  the more extensive rent-seeking or grabbing activity,  so it may considered just an 
indication of total grabbing, the reinterpretation does not create major problem in this respect either. As 
pointed out already by Krueger (1974), there are a number of situations where corruption and rent-
seeking may become substitutes, however.  The classical case is from the Indian import control regime 
where building a manufacturing plant in order to get import quotas could be an alternative to a bribe. 
We assume in the following that such cases are so few that corruption levels are shadowing grabbing 
levels.  
entrepreneurs are increasing  the competition  for gaining access to both the rents 
(accessed through corruption) and the production slots. In a corrupt (‘grabber’) 
equilibrium an opening up with net entry of foreign entrepreneurs should raise the 
number of producers, increase production, lower the number of bribers -  and increase 
the profits in both productive  and corrupt activities. Will this hold in general?  
 
Let us imagine the  two countries A and  B again that have identical production 
structures, the same number of entrepreneurs,  both are in a corrupt equilibrium, and 
so on, but that A  either has a public sector that generates more rent, or that it has a 
lower institutional quality. If the entrepreneurs are unable to move, A will have more 
corrupt entrepreneurs, lower rates of production and lower profits than B. If  now 
entrepreneurs are allowed to move freely they will move from A to B. But then profits 
and production in A will be even lower, the share of corrupt entrepreneurs even 
higher while the development in B should go in the opposite direction as it receives 
more of the former A – entrepreneurs. And this should presumably go on until there 
are zero production in A and the number of corrupt entrepreneurs there are so few that 
each entrepreneur’s share of its rents are equal to the profits of the entrepreneurs in B. 
 If we may imagine that the authorities in A may be worried by the consequences of 
the opening up, and introduce a number of restrictions while B have no reasons to be 
worried, we may observe that in this polarized world the country with restrictions will 
be corrupt and low-productive and the one with high degree of openness and with few 
restrictions will be low-corrupt and high-productive. 
 
This set-up may also supply several hypotheses of how increased corruption levels 
globally may be combined with low corruption levels in the most open economies. 
While difficult to substantiate empirically, there are many indications that the so-
called modernization of the public sector (as well as major changes in the private 
sector) taking place in most counties has increased both the size of rents that are 
susceptible to grabbing (for example by privatisation of public resources) as well as  
their grab- ability5 (visible for example  in  increased lobbying and outsourcing 
                                                 
5 In Mehlum et al (2005) grab-ability is denoted as institutional quality, operationalized as  the un-
weighted mean of five sub-indexes aimed to indicate the rule of law,  bureaucratic quality ,corruption 
index, a risk of  expropriation and risk of government repudiation of contracts. For our purposes 
corruption has, of course, to be treated separate. Moreover, when grab-ability is a political aim, high 
bureaucratic quality may hasten the process, and should also be considered separate. Indexes of this 
activities).The partition of the public sector  in ways that makes  sub-sectors sell to 
each other  also increase the likelihood of  corrupt transactions as well as grab-ability 
of rents since selling implies access to cash. Moreover, in some cases the increased 
grab-ability is tied to measures designed to increase the international openness of the 
economies. 
 
What are the implications for such a common ‘shock’, the increase in available public 
rents? Countries that are able to convert the increase in grab-able public rents into 
private production should increase production and attract internationally mobile 
entrepreneurs, countries below the threshold should get an even higher share of 
grabbers in their entrepreneurial mix at the same time as their stock of entrepreneurs 
as well as production levels are going to shrink. That is, we should expect increasing 
as well as more skewed distribution of corruption levels across countries. 
 
A large share of the increase in grab-able rents is a one time event due to privatisation 
of sectors like telecommunications, energy grids, and so on. It may have lasting 
effects on corruption levels, however, through mechanisms described in Andvig and 
Moene (1990) or similar stories. 
 
 5. Corruption and geographical diffusion of ethical preferences 
 
So far we have looked at models that seek to explain more traditional economic 
behaviour. As pointed out in Andvig (2006), corruption implies a breaking of rules. 
When the rules are different in countries A and B, behaviour that might be corrupt in 
A will be non-corrupt in B. If the rules that apply in A are exported to (forced upon or 
imitated by) B, corruption is also spread indirectly through the imitation of rules. As 
we will see, more subtle forms of  rule transmissions than pure imitation are also 
possible. Moreover, not only rules of governance may spread, the methods of 
breaking them, in this case corruption, or their ethical costs may also spread. 
Diffusion processes may impact the distribution of corrupt behaviour across countries. 
                                                                                                                                            
kind may often make interpretations difficult. Very different ‘variables’ are mixed often for the simple 
reason that one lacks a theory of their interaction, at the same time as one presupposes a high degree of 
substitutability  - a strong theory in fact -  between the different sub-indexes  by the very construction 
of an index.    
A few authors have begun to study such mechanisms recently, partly inspired by 
developments in evolutionary game theory. 
 
A model that may be adapted to throw light on such processes has been constructed 
by Hauk and Saez-Marti (2002), but instead of collective rules they are looking at the 
distribution of individuals’ ethical norms or preferences. They imagine that any 
population is characterized by its distribution of a trait (or preference) determining 
whether an individual tends to behave corruptly or not. The trait may be acquired in 
two ways: A parent may engineer it through a costly teaching process, or it may be 
acquired through a random meeting of another agent who already possess the trait. 
 
The parents are partly altruistic. While they prefer their offspring to possess the same 
trait as themselves they are also consider the consequences of the possession of the 
trait for the child’s future earnings. The probability of a child becoming corrupt is 
increasing by the efforts of its parent, the vertical transmission of preferences (for 
modelling reason each child has only one parent) and the size of the fraction of  the 
population that is already corrupt, the horizontal transmission of preferences. They 
assume the two transmission mechanisms to be cultural substitutes  (Bisin and 
Verdier, 2001) that is, they assume that the higher the incidence of the corrupt trait in 
the population, the lesser will a corrupt parent invests in its offspring to ensure that its 
preference is transmitted. The same mechanism applies, of course, for the parents who 
want to transmit the preference for honesty. q is the fraction of  honest agents in the 
population. 
 
As mentioned, the parents do not only care about the ethics of their offspring, but also 
for the economic well-being it may lead to. To study such consequences, Hauk and 
Saez-Marti borrow a set-up from Tirole (1996). They introduce a number of 
principals that may employ the agents on two types of projects, one is yielding more 
output and is more profitable if the agents are choosing an honest strategy, but is less 
profitable if they are dishonest. The constellation of economic outcomes for the 
agents are assumed such that dishonest agents always will choose the dishonest 
strategy while the honest ones always will stay honest. The principals know q and 
possess a monitoring parameter which indicates the ease by which they may 
discriminate between honest and dishonest agents, although they are unable to 
determine with certainty whether a given agent is honest or not. The principals may 
either choose to only implement the low yielding projects that demand less of the 
agents’ honesty, their pooling strategy, or they may try to determine a mix of the two 
types of projects, their separating strategy. 
 
For a given ability to discriminate between honest and dishonest agents, the principals 
will switch from a pooling to a separating strategy at a given fraction of honesty, q*. 
Parents will invest more in making their children honest if they believe that the 
principals will choose a separating rather than a pooling strategy. With normal 
assumptions we may have two internal stationary states, one characterized by a highly 
corrupt population, with principals following pooling strategies and parents holding 
pooling expectations, another with a low corrupt population where the principals are 
separating and the parents expect them to do so. Note that the model outlines two 
opposite forces if q increases: the principals will tend to use separating strategies 
making it more lucrative to possess non-corrupt preferences and increase the parents’ 
efforts in that direction, but as q  increases the parents will decrease their efforts due 
to the substitution between horizontal and vertical transmission of preferences 
assumed.  
 
Interpreted literally, the model makes hardly sense. It is, for example, difficult to 
imagine that parents deliberately make efforts to teach their children to be corrupt or 
dishonest, used synonymously here. Parents may, however, teach their children to 
invest all their loyalty into the family system to which they belong, whether that is of 
nuclear or extended family types. That may often result in family forms or corruption, 
lack of guilt feelings when engaging in commercial corrupt transactions when 
engaged by formal organizations or more complex forms of interaction between 
contradictory interactions between ‘modern’- impersonal - and family forms of  
transactions (Andvig, 2006). Moreover, the same form of ethics may create problems 
when trying to develop formal organizations, formulated in the model as the high 
output, corruption- sensitive matchings of principals and agents. In a case study from 
a village in Southern Italy Banfield (1958 ) exposes several links between what he 
describes as the deeply rooted  ideology  carried by  ‘amoral familists’, corruption and 
the building of private as well as public organizations. 
 
The Hauk - Saez-Marti set-up may explain variation in corruption levels, particularly  
between countries with family-based and non-family based ethics for public 
behaviour.  It is particularly well designed to explain lasting differences across 
countries. Unlike the preceding models, an opening up of mobility of agents across 
countries are not likely to cause any larger shift in the distribution of corruption levels 
across countries in the short run. This is mainly caused by the substitution between 
the vertical and horizontal transmission of the preferences that lead to corrupt 
transaction: If agents  with highly corrupt preferences move from a country, A, with 
high corruption levels  to B with low corruption (high q), the shifts in their q ‘s will 
be partly mitigated by the tendency of the remaining parents in A  to educate their 
children to become more corrupt, while the parents in B will tend to do the opposite.  
 
The key to more extensive change hinges upon the interaction between the parents’ 
expectations about the principals’ strategy, - whether they expect them to shift from 
pooling to separating strategies, or the other way around; and what in fact determines 
the switch  
 
One may question how realistic it is to assume substitution between the vertical and 
horizontal transmission mechanisms in the case of corruption-related preferences.  
They may rather be complementary, that is parents will be more deeply convinced in 
the correctness of teaching their children the overriding importance of family loyalty 
the more frequent the children are exposed to random agents that share this 
conviction. In this case the model is likely only to have stable stationary states where 
either all or none are corrupt (as the complementary case in Bisin and Verdier (2001) 
models of cultural transmission).  This is, of course, not reasonable predictions, and 
some limitations on reasonable movements in q would be needed, but even so, the 
scope of more dramatic changes when agents with different preferences are allowed to 
move, is reasonable. It is also difficult to imagine that emigration or immigration may 
cause so large shifts in q of the population at large at short notice  – unlike the former 
model’s population of potentially grabbing entrepreneurs who is likely to be much 
more mobile.6 
                                                 
6 We may, however, reinterpret the model in a way that may give greater scope for shifts. When we 
may consider the ethical preferences in the population to have a putty clay structure where not only   
the actual matching of parents, children and the surrounding population are forming the preference  
 In these last sections we have studied some very general ways of how the corruption 
propensities in closed systems may respond when opened up to, confronted or mixed 
with systems  characterized by different propensities. Fitting this level of generality, 
we did not outline any specific mechanisms for economic interaction except allowing 
agents to move between the systems or to receive some general forms of information 
about the characteristics of the other systems. In the following we will look at some of  
the traditional forms of economic interactions across countries: International trade, 
technological spillovers, foreign direct investment and other forms of  cross-border 
financial and international migration flows as well as the existence of cross-border 
organized activities in the shape of multinational companies. 
 
It is not obvious how these (mainly) flows may be connected to cross-border 
corruption. While it may be the case that the more open an economy is, the less 
corrupt it is. Nevertheless, in order to study the propagation as well as the 
containment of corruption across countries we should be aware of the conceivable 
spillover mechanisms. Since no direct measurement of cross-border corruption takes 
place,  a natural starting point is to see how these spillover mechanisms may be 
related to the cross-border aggregates  for which we have statistical information. We 
turn to these issues in the next section. Here it may also be the best place to define the 
concepts of corruption we will use in the following.   
 
6. Economic cross-border flows, cross-border corruption and other 
definitions 
 
Let us first define the corruption concepts used. Here we will follow Andvig (2002, 
2006). Many, somewhat different, definitions of corruption are current in the 
literature. The one most frequently used one is ascribed to Nye (1967: 416) and 
defines corruption as “behavior that deviates from the formal duties of a public role 
(elective or appointive) because of private-regarding (personal, close family, private 
clique) wealth or status gains.” Interpreted literally this definition is too wide for most 
                                                                                                                                            
putty, but all relevant bits of information that reach the children until their preferences become clay. 
When stylised as a fraction of the total information that stimulates corrupt preferences, larger shifts are 
obviously conceivable.  
purposes, since almost every official would then behave corruptly. A more reasonable 
interpretation would be it to cover serious acts of bribing and extortion at its core, and 
depending on the context, to include various types of private-regarding activities at its 
edges. I have few objections to the standard definition interpreted this way, but I have 
found the following one – based on Rose Ackerman (1978: 6-7) somewhat more 
precise and useful for my purposes:  
 
- An act is commercially corrupt if a member of an organization uses his 
position, his rights to make decisions, his access to information, or other resources of 
the organization, to the advantage of a third party and thereby receives money or other 
economically valuable goods or services where either the payment itself or the services 
provided are illegal and/or against the organization's own aims or rules.  
- If the act is mainly motivated by the intangible valuables received, is given by 
the member serving the interests of friends or family, or his own standing in family-
friendship networks, it is an act of family-friendship corruption.  
- An act represents embezzlement if a member of an organization uses his rights 
to make decisions, his labor time, his access to information or some tangible assets of 
the organization to his own economic advantage, eventually to the advantage of some 
other members of the organization, in ways that are either illegal or against the 
organization's own aims or rules. Embezzlement might also be motivated to achieve the 
individual’s standing in family-friendship networks 
 
Regarding this set of definition we observe that corrupt transactions are not a set of 
actions that may be observed as such. Corruption has to be related to a set of rules about 
the proper procedures for transactions; when a person acts corruptly,  a transactional 
mode (Andvig, 2006) is broken. Both family-friendship and commercial corruption 
imply a transaction between at least two actors, one of whom has to be a non-member 
of the organization. In the case of regular, commercial corruption, there is an illegal or 
illegitimate expansion of market transactions into the fields of bureaucratic or political  
fields of transacting. It is obvious, but rarely made clear, that when the rules for the 
proper dividing lines between bureaucratic and market transactions shift over time or 
across countries  so will the scope of what should be considered corrupt.  
 
Embezzlement, on the other hand, may often be performed by a single insider, but large 
scale embezzlement normally involves several people.  More importantly, the rules 
broken are different. While corruption in the narrow sense raises the question of the 
proper way of making transactions, embezzlement challenges the property rights of the 
organization, including the proper internal allocation of the decision-making rights 
Here again the question arises when the system of property rights shift over time or 
across countries: Are the possessors of present rights embezzlers? 
 
Cross-border corruption is the set of all corrupt acts where the one side of the 
transaction involved is located in one country, or represents an organization located in it,  
and the other is located in another country, or represents an organization of it. Even if the 
representative of a bribing organisation is local, but the head office is located outside, the 
bribing is considered to represent cross-border corruption. In addition to cross-border 
corruption, a number of direct spillovers will be included (together with cross-border 
corruption) in what we may designate as international corruption. One such direct form 
of spill-over of corrupt behaviour is corrupt transactions performed by agents who have 
accomplished trans-border migration.  Another example is when a local importer bribe 
the customs. Since he/she has already acquired the property right to the good in question 
it is not a case of cross-border corruption as it would have been if the bribe was paid by 
the exporter.  All corrupt transactions where one side is a member of an international 
organization are also included in international corruption. Corruption that is not cross-
border is internal corruption. Corruption that is not international, is local corruption. 
While cross-border and internal corruption is clearly dichotomous, local and 
international corruption may overlap as the corruption spillover effects of the cross-
border economic transactions work themselves through the economy. Internal plus 
cross-border corruption is equal to a country’s total corruption.  
 
Aggregating total corruption over the set of countries we reach global corruption. In 
order not to double count cross-border corruption of  country A we should not include 
the corrupt transactions performed by A nationals in other countries.  In a similar way as 
we do in national income accounting (GDP versus GNP), we may, if we so wish, count  
all   the A nationals corrupt transactions at home or abroad as total A corruption, and the 
A nationals’ foreign corruption may give a different estimate of the cross-border 
corruption of A. For some purposes we may then distinguish between country A’s 
imported  and  exported cross-border corruption. Hence, it will not be surprising if some 
of the least corrupt countries might be some of the largest net exporters of corruption.    
           ______________________________ 
In the rest of this section we will map some of the typical forms of corruption that 
(imported) cross-border economic transactions may give rise to, that is forms of 
international corruption. The idea behind the mapping is to look at examples of the 
conceivable mechanics in the transmission of  corrupt  behaviour from one country to 
another. Since most public organizations are immobile, much of the eventual direct 
spread of corrupt behaviour has to be connected to cross-border, mostly statistically 
registered economic transactions.7  Spelling out some of these mechanisms don’t imply  
that the more open an economy is, the more corrupt it will be, although its cross-border 
corruption  is likely to increase. It does illustrate however, that if increased openness 
cause lower total corruption, there must be some underlying  forces that may induce 
cross-border and internal corruption to become substitutes. 
 
What kinds of corruption could international trade give rise to? In terms economic value, 
trade is the heavy flow of the cross-border economic transactions. The case of 
international trade with extensive import and capital controls will be briefly discussed in 
a separate section. That case excepted, it is imports that normally will give rise to 
corruption. Like homeland trade, the exporters of goods and services will experience 
perceived excess supply and hence have incentives to offer kickbacks to private and 
public procurement agencies. Most of this will consist of private-to-private corruption. In 
most cases  the actual payment of bribes or kickbacks are delegated to the importing 
agencies or separate local middlemen. The extent of these forms of corruption will, of 
course, vary with the kinds of goods and services in question and the local competitive 
situation.  
 
In the literature it is often assumed that increased import implies less corruption of this 
kind since it may break local monopolies. While probably true on average it needs to be 
qualified. A pure monopoly with full bureaucratic control of its sales agency have no 
incentive to pay bribes of this kind, but may  have incentive to pay bribes at the political 
level to influence the government demand function, and if  the monopoly  is contestable, 
to pay for political protection of its monopoly. One or many suppliers give less scope for 
corruption of this piecemeal variety.  Increased trade will, of course, tend to increase 
international corruption of this form, but may through its impact on the competitive 
conditions of the markets, decrease the total corruption related to trade. 
                                                 
7 There exist, of course, other ways corruption- relevant behaviour may conceivably spread: 
international media, educational institutions with international recruitment of students, multinational 
organizations with multinational recruitment, and so on. The educational institutions are likely to be 
exceptionally important for the spread of political corruption. 
 The most obvious among the possible form of corruption generated through international 
trade is bribing of customs officers. One would normally expect that higher tariffs would 
give stronger incentives for bribing the officers, but tariffs are not the only incentive. 
Even with minimal tariffs customs officers have the power to stamp imported goods as 
legal or not, and may at the very least cause considerable delays, thereby having 
considerable powers of extortion. Sometimes legality grants are rather to be avoided for 
example when importers of are heavily involved in the informal economy. Custom 
officers may then assist in smuggling the per se legal goods through the legal ports of 
entry against bribes. This becomes even more important when the goods are illegal. In 
both cases importers have the alternative of smuggling outside the legal points of entry, 
but also in this case corruption may arise through the bribing of police. The 
containerisation of international trade is likely to favour smuggling through the legal 
points of entry, however. 
 
In countries with high corruption propensities, the relative share of the underground 
economy is expected to be large. While one should expect the import propensities of the 
underground economies to be lower than in the formal economy, the share of its imports 
that will be unregistered and hence will be either smuggled directly or with bribes should 
also be expected o be high. Neighbouring countries with sizeable underground 
economies should be expected to have considerable two ways international trade of this 
kind.  This is one of the most direct corruption spillovers that may lead to a geographical 
clustering of corruption propensities. 
 
International migration may give rise to similar forms of corruption of police and custom 
officers. Again we may distinguish between migration that only misses the stamp of 
legality and migration where the migrants are intended to provide services that are illegal 
on a more lasting basis.  Unlike illegal imported goods, illegal migrants may be in need 
of continuous legal protection, i.e. become lasting sources of bribes. Moreover, customs 
officers are not in a position to grant legality to migrants. They may have to bribe both 
the exit  and entry authorities which in this case will be the immigration authorities 
(eventually an international organization), not the customs.  Larger flows of international 
immigration whether it receive legal stamps or not will then tend to induce international 
corruption. It is unlikely to be so substantial to have the dampening effect on local 
corruption as international trade through its effect on competition. However, if one has a 
large flow of legal immigrants with substantially lower corruption propensities, it is 
conceivable that they might  create a downwards pressure by mixing with the original 
population in ways outlined in the models sketched in the preceding section. At present 
most of the migration is from high to low corrupt areas, however. 
 
Foreign direct investment  has been the indicator of cross-border economic activities that 
has shown the steepest rise the last decade or so. It is used as an indicator of real 
investment initiated by foreigners, but is in fact an indicator embracing both real 
investment processes and  financial transactions. The last aspect may only reflect pure 
ownership changes without any real investment made by either  locals or foreigners. 
Presumably, the forms of corrupt transactions attached to the two sets of activities 
embraced by the hybrid FDI variable may differ significantly. In both cases FDI implies 
a shift (or creation) of foreign control of an enterprise. That shift itself would demand a 
permission of the relevant national authority which again implies that the permission 
may only be granted through a bribe. When a new foreign-controlled enterprise   build 
up a new set of economic activities from scratch, using new capital instruments, a much 
larger set of permissions would be needed  - as it would be if  the enterprise was locally 
controlled. Every permission opens up the possibility of bribes or extortions, hence 
cross-border corruption. A pure ownership shift may only demand one new permission, 
but for some countries it may trigger a renewal of all the permissions involved, hence 
increased FDI would induce increased (total ) corruption in this case. 
 
This does not invalidate the seemingly robust negative association between FDI and 
corruption levels we may find in the empirical literature. It is clear, for example, that the 
bureaucratic complexity of starting up an enterprise, whether foreign or locally owned, 
and the corruption indicator of the country is strongly associated. Hence, such 
complexity is likely to keep foreign investment away. It would not be surprising if this 
effect dominates the direct positive association between FDI and cross-border 
corruption. 
 
A sizeable share of international corruption is tied to public procurement, particularly to  
large construction projects (construction for private organizations such as oil companies 
is also exceptionally exposed  to corruption) and military hardware. However well the 
bidding process is organized the risks of corruption remain high. Neither theoretical 
models (Celentani and Ganuza, 2002) nor empirical studies (Hellman et al, 2000) 
indicate that international bidding would reduce corruption in this field. While we know 
that public procurement constitutes a significant component in aggregate demand (10 – 
15% of GDP in most OECD countries) we don’t know how large share of country 
imports that may be tied to these bidding markets.   
 
  Naturally, as the density of economic interaction between individuals and organizations 
across countries increases, the stock and flows of debts between agents located in 
different countries also increases. Particularly since the lifting of the former batteries of 
controls on the financial markets and the increased convertibility of most currencies, the 
cross-border financial flows and foreign ownership of financial stocks have increased. 
Unlike the case of real goods and service markets, where perceived excess supply is the 
typical situation, perceived excess demand for loans will be typical in the credit markets; 
hence, we will expect eventual bribes to paid by borrowers to creditors. Cross-border 
credit should not differ in this respect. Hence, the larger the international financial flows 
for a given control regime, the larger would cross-border corruption. The lifting of 
controls should work in the opposite direction, if it keeps the loan rate below the market 
rate of interest. 
 
When we are considering the impact of changes in the international financial on cross-
border corruption, these flow aspects of debt may be of less importance compared to the 
stocks. As Hicks (1969: 73) made clear, after a credit is granted, the debtor would like to 
get read of the whole stock of debt incurred, to default. Much of the regulation of 
financial markets, including the international ones, is constructed in order to make that 
option difficult. Somehow financial fraud or embezzlement on whole stocks is the 
typical economic crime in the financial sector. It is easier to embezzle money or credit 
than machines.  Small flows of bribes may be sufficient to embezzle large financial 
stocks. An international system is more difficult to  control for this than a single country.   
 
In particular, the uneven strength in control rights (private and public) across countries 
may be exploited for the purpose. Let A be a country with weak and B a country with 
strong control rights. A public organization in B may, for example, lend a public 
organization in A 1 billion US$. Individual x in A bribes z (also in A ) with US$ 100 000  
to get access to the  loan of 1 billion pretending he is constructing something and transfer 
the 1 billion back to B. Thereby x has used B to establish the  hard property rights to the 
billion that he would be unable to do in A at the same time as he is exploiting the weak 
public organization and property rights  in A to get rid of the specific individual claims 
against himself. The public organization in B would, of course, make all efforts to keep 
its hard claim on the public organization of  A, and is also likely to achieve it.  
 
 While extremely stylised, the procedure where modest bribes may generate large shifts 
in assets, exploiting an international architecture that combine a financial system that 
may move claims around the world with low transaction costs (high mobility) with a 
distribution of highly uneven hardness of control rights is likely to reflect hard realities, 
or so it will appear when we look at some of the African data to be considered in a 
follow-up paper. 
 
In this case both x and z are locals, hence it is strictly speaking a case of local corruption, 
but the instruments and consequences are so intimately weaved into the international 
system that we will treat it as a form of international corruption. Moreover, it suggests 
one of the more plausible mechanisms where increased openness globally may stimulate 
global corruption while the most open countries may be the least corrupt. 
 
This form of embezzlement is easier to implement if at least x is a politician. Foreign 
companies may also be involved in bribing at the political level when involved in large 
contracts, if they see the possibility of recurrent import orders of some magnitude, and so 
on. We will expect it to be positively related to both imports and FDI levels .Needless to 
add, the growth of so-called tax heavens that have followed the opening of  national 
economies have facilitated transactions of these kinds as they are designed for  
transferring soft (claims of doubtful legitimacy) into hard claims and hard into soft 
debits.  
 
Another source of international corruption arise through the interaction between officials 
from different countries, indicated by the size of foreign aid. We mentioned the extreme 
possibility of large-scale fraud. More pedestrian, but important is the countless number 
of aid projects that are distributed across aid-receiving countries. Corruption that arise in 
those may be considered as part of international corruption even if no officials in the aid-
giving country may be directly involved. The same applies to the more recent forms of 
general budget aid.   
 
7. Growth theory and the geographical spread of corruption densities 
 
It is rather obvious that if corruption levels somehow have negative impact on economic 
growth rates, and persistently so, one should after a while also observe a negative 
association between corruption ( C ) and GDP levels. Furthermore, if GDP levels have 
negative impact on corruption rates, one should expect a tendency towards clustering of 
into poor and corrupt and affluent and low corrupt countries. The longer a growth 
process of the kind suggested persists, the more skewed distribution of corruption and 
GDP levels one should expect. If the degree of openness of the international economic 
system in the meantime has opened up, the skewed distribution of corruption levels may 
be wrongly be ascribed to it, being mainly caused by different national growth processes. 
Furthermore, if the positive growth is going together high and increasing levels of 
international trade, one may observe high trade intensity going together with low 
corruption and high GDP levels, opening up the possibility of ascribing  further causal 
structures. 
 
One possibility is to look at the triangle international trade, GDP and C as determined in 
a simple old-fashioned Keynes model: export determines GDP, GDP determines C. To 
increase export is the key. If that increase is conditioned by openness, openness is the 
key. Increase exports gives increased GDP gives reduced corruption. This might be 
turned around: C determines GDP and GDP determines imports and thereby the degree 
of openness.  One might look at the data to determine the degree of correlation, and 
through different econometric techniques determine which direction of causation that 
appears most reasonable. Kaufmann and Kraay (2002) argue for the C –to – GDP 
causation. If so, anti-corruption policy appears to become very important. Significant 
changes in corruption levels may cause large shifts in GDP levels. Lambsdorff (2003) 
illustrates that possibility. But do effective anti-corruption policies exist, and if they do, 
may they impact GDP-levels directly?  If corruption mainly affects GDP growth rates, 
not GDP levels, to correlate present GDP with present corruption will tend to 
overestimate its impact on GDP.  
 
Blackburn, Bose and Haque have developed a set of models (Blackburn, Bose and 
Haque ,2002, 2003, 2005) that build  corruption into a  framework of  overlapping 
generations growth model intended to simulate  what appears to be the set of  stylised 
facts of the distribution of corruption across countries. The models focus on bureaucratic 
corruption, but specify different forms of bureaucratic acts. In Blackburn, Bose and 
Haque (2002, 2003) they may collide with the higher income citizens  in tax evasion, in 
(2005) they receive bribes in public procurement processes. The production functions 
are also somewhat different, but in all ‘output’ from the public sector functions as a kind 
of input in the production function. The more corruption the lower is this input. The 
production process is guided by profit maximization. The public output increases the 
marginal productivity of both labour and capital. Capital and labour are complementary 
factors in the production function.  Hence, the larger the capital stock, the higher the 
marginal productivity of labour, which determines the wage rate (the supply of labour is 
fixed). 
 
The wages of the public officials are set by the wage rate in the private sector. The gain 
of bribes for the bureaucrats has to be set against the expected loss when caught. That 
loss is determined by the wage rate. For a given capital stock, the more extensive the 
corruption, the lower the public output and the lower the wage rate. Hence the relative 
gain by choosing the corrupt action increases with the number who chooses it. As the 
capital stock increases, the wage rate also does so, and the relative value of the corrupt 
option decreases. Compared to the rather arbitrary corruption equilibria in most former 
multiple equilibrium models, the size of the capital stock (per capita) here anchors the 
corruption rates. 
 
 If the capital stock is sufficiently low all corruptible bureaucrats will choose the corrupt 
action in a low output, high corruption economy with low steady state growth paths. Any 
capital stock lower than this lower bound will also have this maximal corruption rate.   If 
the capital stock is sufficiently high, on the other hand, no corruptible official will 
choose to become corrupt and we will observe high output,  high growth rate economies 
with negligible corruption.  
 
Hence, both around the lower and upper bound levels of capital stock we should expect 
small variation in corruption rates.  For economies with level of capital stocks between 
the upper and lower bounds, on the other hand, multiple equilibria are possible. The 
main mechanism here is the positive spillover effects from the other agents’ choice of 
corruption on the relative value of the corrupt option. Hence, here we should expect 
greater variation in corruption levels. All together, these models appear to accommodate 
the main facts of high corruption rates in poor countries, low corruption rates in rich 
ones and wider variation in the corruption rates of the intermediate regimes. 
 
We should note that here a cross country distribution of corruption rates are predicted on 
the basis of parallel growth processes that do not assume any cross-border interaction. 
The initial – to the growth process – distribution of capital stocks is the main predictor. It 
is reasonable to assume that the import levels increases with output. Hence, the high 
output low corruption rate economies will be the most open ones, but the openness as 
such has nothing to do with the low corruption rate. It is a pure coflux relation.  
 
The Blackburn et al’s models have a number of appealing features. Several of the 
unrealistic assumptions are, of course, made purely for the needs of stringent model 
building (particularly its overlapping generation features that we haven’t exposed here), 
and it would be inappropriate also to criticise them here where we are not focused on the 
model technicalities. It is a problem, however, that it is the loss of comparable wage 
income that is the main driver of the result that richer countries have less corruption. 
Richer countries have richer bureaucrats who thereby have more to loose. But would not 
the risk of loosing your wages in a poor country felt to be higher? Here you may risk to 
sink into an abyss of poverty. In any case, a model of this kind could be built by  varying 
the degree in the efficiency of monitoring technology with GDP levels that should yield 
quite similar results. 
 
Mauro (2002) produces two models. One is very close to Blackburn et al (2002, 2003) 
and applies a similar  Barro (1990) inspired way of introducing public output into a neo 
classical production function. The second model relates corruption, growth and political 
instability. The way corruption is introduced differ somewhat, but the conclusions are 
similar.  Ellis and Fender (2003) also use a Barro-like mechanism to make public 
investment play an output-enhancing role and  makes corruption drag down output that 
way. Again, the corruption mechanism is different, focusing more on political 
corruption. The dynamics are more complex by the authors introducing a kind of 
recognition lag between the point of time when a bribe is grabbed and the time it is 
recognized by the public as a bribe with the corresponding potential political impact. 
This lag is set equal to the production lag of public investment. The longer the lag, the 
less transparent is the public sector. Again, the model predicts similar relationships 
between GDP, its growth rate and the extensiveness of corruption in the public sector as 
the ones of Blackburn and Mauro. 
 
Ellis and Fender (2003) develop an outside option for corrupt politician that is of 
particular interest from our point of view. If the politicians may safely retreat and move 
to a foreign country with  the corrupt income gained,  corruption increases; both private 
and public consumption decrease and the economy is shifted into slower growth paths. - 
When looking more closely into the potential empirical role of corruption for capital 
exports from a number of African countries, we will spell out their assumptions in more 
detail. 
 
 Ehrlich and Lui (1999) have developed a different set of  models that also partly relies 
on modern endogenous growth theory when studying the impact of corruption. They do 
not apply any Barro-mechanism, however. The negative output effects of corruption 
work mainly through reducing the accumulation of human capital. Agents may either  
accumulate productive human capital or ‘political’ capital. Political human capital 
increases the agent’s share of consumable output (rent) without contributing to the 
making of output.  The more he/she invests in political capital compared to the rest of the 
group, the larger the share. Ehrlich and Lui interpret the whole  public sector as  relying 
on this mode of distribution. Hence the larger the public sector, the more extensive is the 
corruption and the stronger the incentive for accumulation of political capital. One of the 
reasons why modern economies is less hampered by corruption, is however,  that they 
allow a complete specialization of agents into human capital investing and political 
capital investing agents. The more productive the human capital and the larger the share 
of its investors, the higher is the growth rate. 
 
It may be difficult to take their negative vision of the whole public sector seriously. 
Considering that most kinds of income are generated through some joint efforts (whether 
it is the government taxing income or  a private company manufacturing output) where it 
is in most cases hardly possible to determine agents’ marginal contributions, and if it 
were, it may not become the obvious rule for income sharing. They are in fact pointing 
out a very general mechanism that not only applies to the public sector: Agents are likely 
to make considerable efforts to increase their share both through influencing the share of 
their income-generating group as well as their own share within this group. These 
sharing rules may be more or less easy to influence through direct efforts, hence each 
member’s efforts may be directed more or less into this ‘political’ direction. In different 
ways extended family systems, project methods of organization may, for example, cause 
over investment in networking, that is, investment in human political capital. To 
consider all such investment to be corruption may be to stretch the concept too far, 
however, although they are pointing at an important issue that has worried economists 
throughout the ages. 8 
 
Whatever the precise interpretation of their models, Ehrlich and Lui (1999) present 
corruption and growth rates as two endogenous variables, likely to be inversely related, 
as have been the case with the former growth models. They also present empirical 
estimates. It is clear, however, that it is difficult to discriminate between these different 
growth models on the basis of econometric results. The reason is partly that their 
reduced forms are quite similar, but partly the lack of precise and direct knowledge of 
the different forms of corruption. So far, the econometric research has to rely on very 
aggregate and probably very noisy indexes of corruption. They are unable to 
discriminate, for example, corruption in tax collection from corruption in public 
procurement, or bureaucratic versus political corruption. In a later paper  these model 
will be  explored more closely  in order to determine the possibilities for empirical 
discrimination.  
 
 
  
 
 
  
                                                 
8 The idea that the efforts in rent-seeking (whether by peaceful or violent means) may be seen as a 
process where each will receive a share that is determined by his/her efforts compared to a kind of  
average efforts, is an old one.  They may easily generate multiple equilibria through their strategic 
complementarity.  Pareto made an early statement as emphasized by Haavelmo. In addition to the rent-
seeking/corruption field the present models  of this kind focus  on warfare and power.  Some years ago 
they were also applied in analyses of  inflation  (cf.  Andvig, 1977).   
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